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The Insidious Colonialism of the Conqueror: The 
Federal Government in Modern Tribal Affairs 
Matthew L.M. Fletcher∗ 
I think Indian people really understand the outside culture 
much better than the outside culture understands us, because 
we have been in the minority of strength. 
—Oren Lyons, Onondaga Turtle Clan traditional chief1 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION INTO 
TRIBAL AFFAIRS 
Chief Justice John Marshall wrote in 1832 that the English, the 
predecessors of the Americans, “never intruded into the interior of 
[Indian tribal] affairs, nor interfered with their self-government.”2 
Conversely, almost from the beginning of the reservation system, 
Americans have alternated between extreme imposition on Indian 
 ∗ Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Dakota School of Law; Director, 
Northern Plains Indian Law Center; Appellate Judge, Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians and 
Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians; Member and former Staff Attorney, Grand 
Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians. The opinions expressed in this piece are the 
author’s only, and do not necessarily represent any position any tribe may take or has taken, and 
may not be attributed to any tribe. Special thanks to Steven Gunn for his extremely helpful 
comments and to the editors of the Washington University Journal of Law and Policy, 
especially Heather Buethe, Katherine Lieb, and Paul McCaffrey, for allowing me to contribute 
to the symposium from an American Indian Law perspective. The author had the opportunity to 
present many of the concepts discussed in this Article at the Inaugural Indigenous Law 
Conference hosted by Del Laverdure of Michigan State University College of Law on October 
29, 2004. Migwetch to Del and to the participants on the Tribal Constitutional Law panel: 
Richard Monette, Stacy Leeds, Pat Sekaquaptewa, and Riyaz Kanji. Chi-migwetch to Wenona 
Singel, as always. 
 1. Oren Lyons, When You Talk About Client Relationships, You Are Talking About the 
Future of Nations, in RETHINKING INDIAN LAW iv (Nat’l Lawyers Guild, Comm. on Native 
American Struggles ed., 1982). 
 2. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 517 (1832). 
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tribal affairs and tortious neglect.3 By the end of the 19th century, the 
United States Indian agent 
ha[d] developed into an officer with power to direct the affairs 
of the Indians and to transact their business in all details and in 
all relations. This is a very curious chapter in our history. 
There is a striking contrast between “ministers 
plenipotentiary,” appointed by the United States to treat with 
powerful Indian nations, and an army officer, with troops at his 
command, installed over a tribe of Indians to maintain an 
absolute military despotism. Yet our policy of dealing with 
them has swung from one of these extremes to the other in a 
strangely vacillating way.4 
Felix Cohen, former Assistant Solicitor for Indian Affairs in the 
Department of Interior5 and author of the Handbook of Federal 
Indian Law,6 wrote a classic article in 1953 about the rise of the 
imperialistic Bureau of Indian Affairs.7 He noted how the Bureau he 
worked for in the 1930s and 1940s had fallen from grace between 
1948 and 1953.8 Cohen wrote that, for example, “administrations 
 3. For example, the Department of Interior “administratively terminated” several 
Michigan Indian tribes by simply refusing to acknowledge them as tribes. See Pokagon Band of 
Potawatomi Indians Act and the Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians and the Little 
River Band of Ottawa Indians Act: Hearing on S. 1066 and S. 1357 Before the S. Comm. on 
Indian Affairs, 103d Cong. 44 (1994) (statement of William J. Brooks, Michigan Indian Legal 
Services, Inc.). An 1855 treaty created “the Ottawa and Chippewa Indians of Michigan,” but 
then dissolved this legal fiction a few years later by the terms of the treaty. See Treaty of 
Detroit, 11 Stat. 621, 624 (1855) (“The tribal organization of said Ottawa and Chippewa Indians 
is hereby dissolved.”). The Secretary incorrectly interpreted that language as terminating the 
tribes, including the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians, in 1872. See Grand 
Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians v. Office of the U.S. Att’y, 369 F.3d 960, 961 
(6th Cir. 2004). 
 4. Felix S. Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950–1953: A Case Study In 
Bureaucracy, 62 YALE L.J. 348, 352–53 (1953) (quoting REP. COMM’R OF INDIAN AFFAIRS 24 
(1892)). One example of the harsh federal policy is the nineteenth century practice of 
summarily executing Indians who violated the orders of Indian agents. See id. at 360–61 n.50 
(quoting REP. COMM’R OF INDIAN AFFAIRS 101 (1866)); cf. Carol Chomsky, The United States-
Dakota War Trials: A Study in Military Injustice, 43 STAN. L. REV. 13, 13–14 (1990) 
(describing the summary execution of Dakota Indians by the United States military with the 
tacit approval of President Abraham Lincoln). 
 5. See Cohen, supra note 4, at 348 n.†. 
 6. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (2nd prtg. 1971). 
 7. See generally Cohen, supra note 4. 
 8. Id. 
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which sought to restrict Indian freedom have generally made sure that 
Indian tribes were not permitted to employ attorneys who might be 
inclined to challenge [the Bureau].”9 In another egregious example 
involving the Blackfeet Tribe in 1950, the Bureau “mimeographed 
materials attacking certain candidates for local tribal office, charging 
them with various ‘criminal’ and ‘illegal’ acts (none of which were 
ever prosecuted and most of which were later shown never to have 
occurred).”10 The Bureau did the same thing at future Blackfeet 
elections and expanded their politicking interventions to Choctaw 
elections as well.11 Worse, the Bureau directly interfered with more 
elections at San Ildefonso Pueblo, where they seized tribal property 
in retaliation against the Pueblo for choosing a Governor without an 
election.12 When the Oglala Sioux Tribe criticized the Bureau in 
Congress for its wasteful expenditures, “the Indians were advised [by 
the Bureau] that $140,000 of credit funds allocated to the tribe 
several months earlier would be ‘frozen’ until the tribe withdrew its 
criticisms.”13 
Cohen detailed how the Bureau testified against bills repealing the 
paternalistic statutes regulating Indian cattle ranching or involving 
the sale of liquor, ammunition, agricultural implements, clothing, and 
cooking utensils to Indians.14 The Bureau closed down Indian 
hospitals on rural reservations because the Indian Affairs 
Commission believed “that Indians should not be encouraged to 
remain on reservations.”15 The Bureau’s non-Indian officials insisted 
on being present during private Pueblo ceremonies on the Rio Grande 
that strictly prohibited non-Indians from attending.16 The Bureau 
ordered Blackfeet Indians to stop playing stick games after 6 p.m. 
and to go to bed.17 Cohen noted that the Bureau’s intervention into 
the personal lives of Pueblo Indians was particularly acute: 
 9. Id. at 352; see also id. at 355–56. 
 10. Id. at 353. 
 11. See id. at 354. 
 12. See id. at 354–55. 
 13. Id. at 356. 
 14. See id. at 356–57. 
 15. Id. at 358. 
 16. See id. at 359. 
 17. See id. at 360 (quoting Interior Department Appropriations for 1953: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 82d Cong. 840 (1952)). 
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[T]he Bureau issue[d] an official report telling the Rio Grande 
Pueblos that their custom of annual elections [was] causing 
“much trouble” in the handling of farm machinery; that their 
communal use of grazing lands [was] lowering their grazing 
income; that their individual partitioning of farming lands 
[was] lowering their agricultural income; and that their 
religious customs . . . caus[ed] them to put “too much labor” 
on their corn fields.18 
The Bureau ignored the Indian preference provisions for Bureau 
employment, arguing that “Indians are ‘not yet ready’ to run their 
own public services.”19 Cohen asserted that despite the Bureau’s 
imposition of “hundreds of special restrictions [on Indian lands] 
which do not apply to their white neighbors, Indians have survived on 
land where white men would starve to death and under regulations 
which could drive men of any race to insanity.”20 The list goes on. 
This was the Bureau of the termination era and, in the words of Ada 
Deer, a Menominee Indian, “represented a . . . revolutionary forced 
change in the traditional Menominee way of life. . . . Congress 
expected immediate Menominee assimilation of non-Indian culture, 
values, and life styles.”21 
In 1970, President Richard Nixon ended (or took credit for 
ending) the termination policy and urged Congress to support the 
trust relationship between Indian tribes and individual Indians and the 
federal government.22 Congress enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act 
of 1968,23 which, among other things, provided for the retrocession of 
state criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indian Country imposed on 
several states during the termination era.24 After Nixon’s statement of 
policy, Congress enacted the Indian Financing Act of 197425 and the 
 18. Id. at 361 (footnotes omitted). 
 19. Id. at 362. 
 20. Id. at 363. 
 21. CHARLES F. WILKINSON & THE AMERICAN INDIAN RES. INST., INDIAN TRIBES AS 
SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENTS: A SOURCEBOOK ON FEDERAL-TRIBAL HISTORY, LAW, AND 
POLICY 12 (2d ed. 2004) (quoting Hearing on H.R. 7421 Before the Subcomm. on Indian 
Affairs, 93d Cong. 32–36 (1973)). 
 22. See 116 CONG. REC. 23258 (1970). 
 23. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–41 (2000). 
 24. Id. § 1323. 
 25. Id. §§ 1451–1544. 
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Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975,26 
repudiating the termination era and cementing the beginning of the 
self-determination era. 
However, overt colonialism in defiance of self-determination or as 
a remnant of termination takes many forms even today. For example, 
the Navajo Nation recently brought a claim against Peabody Coal,27 a 
company that lobbied the Secretary of the Interior to execute a 
document that would keep its royalty payments to the Navajo Nation 
for the extraction of coal at significantly less than market value.28 The 
Supreme Court found that the United States could not be sued for 
money damages arising from this action,29 damages that would have 
amounted to over $600 million.30  
Similarly, the Skokomish Tribe sued the City of Tacoma over a 
decision of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission that allowed 
the City to build dams that completely destroyed the Tribe’s river 
fisheries.31 The Tuscarora Indian Nation lost before the Supreme 
Court in its efforts to prevent the condemnation of lands owned by 
the tribe in accordance with a treaty; the lands were condemned to 
allow for the construction of a dam.32 The Three Affiliated Tribes of 
the Fort Berthold Reservation lost almost their entire reservation 
when the federal government forced its leaders to agree to the 
construction of yet another dam.33 The Department of Interior often 
denies tribes payments of indirect costs necessary to operate self-
determination contracts.34 The topics omitted from this list are many. 
 26. Id. § 450. 
 27. See Navajo Nation v. Peabody Holding Co., 209 F. Supp. 2d 269, 272 (D.D.C. 2002), 
aff’d, 64 F. App’x 783 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 28. See Brief of Navajo Nation at 7–13, United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 
(2003) (No. 01-1375). 
 29. See Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488. 
 30. See Transcript of Oral Argument of Paul E. Frye on Behalf of the Respondent at 30, 
Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (No. 01-1375). 
 31. See Skokomish Indian Tribe v. United States, 410 F.3d 506 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc), 
petition for cert. filed, 74 U.S.L.W. 3233 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2005). 
 32. See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99 (1960). 
 33. See Raymond Cross, Sovereign Bargains, Indian Takings, and the Preservation of 
Indian Country in the Twenty-First Century, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 425, 484–89 (1998). 
 34. See Thompson v. Cherokee Nation, 334 F.3d 1075, 1080–81 (Fed. Cir. 2003), cert. 
granted, 541 U.S. 934 (2004); Cherokee Nation v. Thompson, 311 F.3d 1054, 1056 (10th Cir. 
2003), cert. granted, 541 U.S. 934 (2004).  
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This Article focuses on the actions of federal agencies that often 
do not appear on the radar screen, either because no existing cause of 
action allows the tribes to bring suit in federal court to enjoin the 
government’s actions, or because federal law limits tribal 
sovereignty. 
Part II of this Article discusses four case studies: the Grand 
Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians’ struggle to retain its 
right to determine its own membership requirements; the Saginaw 
Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan’s response through its tribal 
court of appeals to federal intervention in a tribal election dispute; the 
erosion of tribal rights to restore lost land and expand economic 
development opportunities; and the continuing impact of the 
Bureau’s sale of Indian land without Indian consent. 
Part III places these case studies in the broader context of how 
federal bureaucratic actions have rendered meaningless critical 
aspects of self-determination. This portion of the Article argues that 
meaningful self-determination requires bureaucratic 
acknowledgement of Indian tribes’ exclusive right to determine 
membership; that Indian tribes must be allowed to decide internal 
disputes without any interference from the federal government; that 
Indian tribes must be allowed to restore the land base to a critical 
mass for each tribe in order to allow for adequate economic 
development activities; that Indian tribes retain a right to a remedy 
for the past violations of law of which they are a victim; and that, 
finally, Indian tribes have a right to a competent trustee. 
The Article concludes in Part IV with a bleak vision, describing 
areas of critical tribal interest in which the federal bureaucracy is 
likely to maintain its paternalistic attitudes. Nevertheless, much of 
what ground has been lost can be regained with a simple change 
toward recognition of principles of self-determination on the part of 
the federal bureaucracy. 
II. CASE STUDIES OF INSIDIOUS COLONIALISM 
With the establishment of the self-determination era, Indian tribes 
began to assert their inherent sovereignty over both internal and 
external affairs. On the surface, the federal government, working 
mostly through the Bureau of Indian Affairs, grants tribes the space 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol19/iss1/15
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to develop as tribes. But this space often amounts to paying mere lip 
service to the notion of tribal sovereignty. As Derrick Bell’s “interest 
convergence dilemma” theory suggests,35 the leeway granted to tribes 
in the self-determination era has limitations—the major limitation 
being that where non-Indian interests are affected, tribal self-
government must give way.36 The following four case studies are 
illustrative, but not isolated, examples of how the federal bureaucracy 
and agency-level policy makers subvert the concept of tribal self-
determination. 
A. The Secretary and the Grand Traverse Band 
The insidious colonialism of the conqueror takes one form in an 
area fundamental to Indian tribes: the establishment and codification 
of tribal law through the adoption of its initial constitution and 
membership requirements.37 Under federal law, if an Indian tribe 
reorganizes in accordance with the Indian Reorganization Act, the 
Secretary of Interior must first approve the tribe’s proposed 
constitution.38 For tribes recently recognized or reorganized, this 
requirement allows the federal government to decide elemental 
questions of tribal law that should be decided by the tribe alone. 
Tribes should have exclusive authority over internal tribal matters 
such as membership requirements.39 Depending on an 
administration’s political leanings, this approval requirement can do 
enormous damage to Indian tribes by creating artificial and arbitrary 
tribal membership requirements. 
In 1981, President Ronald Reagan appointed James Watt as 
Secretary of the Interior.40 He presided over the Department of the 
 35. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence 
Dilemma, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 20 
(Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995). 
 36. Cf. id. at 22 (“The interests of blacks in achieving racial equality will be 
accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites.”). 
 37. See generally Timothy W. Joranko & Mark C. Van Norman, Indian Self-
Determination at Bay: Secretarial Authority to Disapprove Tribal Constitutional Amendments, 
29 GONZ. L. REV. 81 (1993–94). 
 38. 25 U.S.C. § 476(a)(2), (d) (2000). 
 39. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55–56 (1978). 
 40. See Watt Loses Another Job—As Attorney for Crow Indian Tribe, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 19, 
1987, at 30. 
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Interior’s shift in focus from preservation of public lands to 
development of public lands.41 Watt, like the Reagan Administration 
in general,42 was no friend to Indian tribes, and he presided over the 
“fire-sale” of coal rights on Indian lands to the detriment of tribes.43 
Watt’s apparent policy regarding Indian tribes was to eliminate all 
federal involvement, including the Bureau of Indian Affairs. This 
policy is suggested by his comment that Indian tribes are “an 
example of the failures of socialism.”44 Watt’s reign as Secretary of 
Interior was a low-water mark in modern tribal-federal relations 
during the self-determination era. 
The Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians, the 
first Indian tribe to be administratively recognized by the Branch of 
Acknowledgement and Research,45 was an early victim of Watt’s 
government-shrinking, anti-Indian policies. After recognition in 
 41. See George Cameron Coggins & Doris K. Nagel, “Nothing Beside Remains”: The 
Legal Legacy of James G. Watt’s Tenure as Secretary of the Interior on Federal Land Law and 
Policy, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 473, 490–91, 518–20 (1990). 
 42. See generally Robert A. Williams, Small Steps on the Long Road to Self-Sufficiency 
for Indian Nations: The Indian Tribe Governmental Tax Status Act of 1982, 22 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 335, 337–39 (1985). 
The Reagan administration’s policy is premised principally upon the simplistic yet 
chimerical belief that the ‘avenue of development for many tribes’ lies in the 
supposedly abundant natural resources underlying land that the nineteenth century 
American government regarded as useless. Unfortunately, such a policy ignores the 
fact that fewer that one in eight Indian Nations has energy and mineral reserves that 
can be developed. In the minds of many Indian leaders and their people, federal 
policies premised upon such a belief implicitly condone a neocolonial status for those 
tribes fortuitously sitting atop strategic mineral and energy stockpiles. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 43. See James Coates, Ruling Rakes Watt Land Leases over Coals, CHI. TRIB., June 9, 
1985, at 4. 
 44. Reagan Outlines Policy on Tribes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1983, at A16 (“If you want an 
example of the failures of socialism, don’t go to Russia. Come to America, and see the 
American Indian reservations.”). Watt later apologized, but added that “his comments had 
focused attention on problems that have been around for decades. ‘I have given you an 
opportunity, don’t muff it,’ Mr. Watt said.” Associated Press, Watt Apologizes to Indians for 
any ‘Hurt’ from Socialism Remarks, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1983, at A13. In fact, it appeared that 
Watt’s “apology” was nothing of the sort: “Mr. Watt conceded that he might have used 
‘unartful language’ in making the comments, but added, grinning, ‘boy, I got attention.’” Id. 
 45. See Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians v. Office of the U.S. Att’y, 
369 F.3d 960, 962 (6th Cir. 2004); Determination for Federal Acknowledgment of the Grand 
Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians as an Indian Tribe, 45 Fed. Reg. 19,321 (Mar. 
25, 1980). 
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1980, the Bureau of Indian Affairs informed the Grand Traverse 
Band that it “will not be eligible to organize and adopt a constitution 
under the Indian Reorganization Act until a reservation has been set 
aside for it.”46 In a classic pincer maneuver that placed the Band’s 
feet to the fire, the Bureau strongly implied that it would not declare a 
reservation until the Band agreed to amend its proposed constitution 
to exclude more than eighty percent of its proposed membership.47 
The Bureau admit[ted] it is well established that Indian tribes 
have authority to determine their own members, there is an 
equally fundamental principle that membership in an Indian 
tribe is a bilateral, political relationship which derives its legal 
significance from, and is dependent upon, an interaction 
between the individual and the tribal community. The 
existence of such a relationship was one of the criteria 
considered in the acknowledgement process. During that 
process it was determined that the group of 297 individuals 
met this criterion and their acknowledgement as a tribe was 
based upon that determination.48 
The Bureau told the Band that its federal acknowledgement 
depended completely on the Bureau’s interpretation of the 
relationship between individual Michigan Ottawas and the Band.49 As 
the Band sought to expand its definition of membership, the Bureau 
responded with threats: it would refuse to distribute Indian Claims 
Commission judgment funds;50 refuse to declare a reservation;51 cut 
off federal program funds;52 refuse to take additional land into trust;53 
 46. Letter from Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Indian Affairs (Operations), to Joseph C. 
Raphael, Chairman Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians (Nov. 4, 1983) (on 
file with author) [hereinafter 1983 Letter]. 
 47. See id. 
 48. Id.  
 49. Id. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See id. The Bureau eventually did declare an initial reservation in 1984. See Grand 
Traverse Band, 369 F.3d at 962 (citing Grand Traverse Band of Chippewa and Ottawa Indians 
Establishment of Reservation, 49 Fed. Reg. 2025 (Jan. 17, 1984)). 
 52. See Letter from Acting Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Indian Affairs, to Joseph Raphael, 
Chairman Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians (Mar. 18, 1985) (on file with 
author). 
 53. See id. 
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refuse to issue treaty fishing cards;54 and, most incredibly, reconsider 
federal recognition of the Band (which it had no authority whatsoever 
to do on its own).55 The Bureau’s choice of language in their 
communication to the Band is remarkable. It reads more as a threat 
from an organized crime boss extorting shop owners56 than as useful 
advice from the Band’s trustee. The Bureau used its authority under 
the Indian Reorganization Act not to assist the Band, but to force the 
Band to shrink—fewer Band members means that there are fewer 
persons eligible for services from the federal government.57 This, 
then, was the on-the-ground result of the James Watt-era Bureau 
policy. 
Once the Bureau realized that it could extort the newly-recognized 
Grand Traverse Band in this manner, it extended its extortion to other 
newly-recognized Indian tribes. The Bureau, in reviewing the 
Jamestown Klallam tribe’s proposed constitution, “made some rather 
significant changes to the membership provisions.”58 The Bureau 
 54. See id. 
 55. See id. (“The character of the current membership is such that it raises the question of 
whether the acknowledgement decision validly applies to the Band as now constituted.”); Letter 
from Scott Keep, Assistant Solicitor, Tribal Gov’t & Alaska Branch, to William Rastetter (July 
2, 1985) (on file with author). 
 56. See 1983 Letter, supra note 46. 
It was our thought that in this interim period while a decision on the reservation 
proclamation is pending, the tribe might want to consider our concerns about the 
membership provisions contained in the tribal draft. If the band wishes to submit 
another alternative which would address our concerns, it of course may do so. We 
thought we should let you know, prior to a decision on the proposed proclamation of a 
reservation, of our concern . . . . 
Id. 
 57. Ironically, now that the Little River Band of Ottawa Indians and Little Traverse Bay 
Bands of Ottawa Indians are federally recognized, see 25 U.S.C. § 1300k–2 (2000), and the 
Muskegon River, Grand River, and Burt Lake Bands are petitioning for federal recognition, see 
Proposed Finding Against Federal Acknowledgement of the Burt Lake Band of Ottawa and 
Chippewa Indians, Inc., 69 Fed. Reg. 20,027 (Apr. 15, 2004); Receipt of Petitions for Federal 
Acknowledgment of Existence as an Indian Tribe, 68 Fed. Reg. 13,724, 13,725 (Mar. 20, 2003) 
(Muskegon River Band); Grand River Band Ottawa Council; Receipt of Petition for Federal 
Acknowledgment of Existence as an Indian Tribe, 60 Fed. Reg. 8136 (Feb. 10, 1995); cf. 
STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES: THE AUTHORITATIVE ACLU GUIDE 
TO INDIAN AND TRIBAL RIGHTS 404 (3d ed. 2002) (listing the Burt Lake Band of Ottawa and 
Chippewa Indians and the Grand River Band of Ottawa Indians as state-recognized tribes), the 
federal dollars spent on splitting up those Michigan Ottawa groups is exponentially higher. 
 58. Memorandum from Chief, Branch of Tribal Enrollment Servs., to Chief, Branch of 
Tribal Relations (Apr. 19, 1983) (on file with author) [hereinafter 1983 Memorandum]. 
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based its apparent authority to force these changes based on the 
“precedent” it created by forcing the Grand Traverse Band to amend 
its membership criteria.59 The Bureau took the stance that the 
Jamestown Klallam’s members must “have a ‘significant community 
relationship’ with the Jamestown Klallam Tribe.”60 This “significant 
community relationship” requirement has no basis in statutory or case 
law. 
In short, the Bureau used its authority to approve tribal 
constitutions under the Indian Reorganization Act to force newly-
recognized tribes to succumb to its political decisions on tribal 
membership. Because of the constantly shifting federal and state 
definitions of “Indian”61 and because of a tribe’s right to determine its 
own membership, such meddling for pure political purposes is patent 
colonialism. 
B. The Assistant Secretary and the Saginaw Chippewa Tribe 
The Bureau sometimes intruded upon the purely internal tribal 
issues arising out of tribal elections by using its power to selectively 
recognize an Indian tribe’s leadership. In one admittedly difficult 
instance, Kevin Gover, former Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs, 
appeared to overstep his bounds by using this power to force a tribal 
election in accordance with the Bureau’s official wishes.62 The power 
to determine which tribal “faction” or “leader” to deal with is no 
license to actively intervene in purely tribal affairs. 
The issue arose when the tribal council of the Saginaw Chippewa 
Indian Tribe of Michigan nullified four of five general and primary 
 59. See id. (“We have made some rather significant changes to the membership provisions 
consistent with some decisions that have been made in conjunction with Departmental review 
of the Grand Traverse Band’s proposed constitution.”). The Bureau has a long history of 
coercing Indian tribes to accept narrow membership criteria. See, e.g., Snowden v. Saginaw 
Chippewa Indian Tribe, 32 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law Training Program, Inc.) 6047, 
6048–49 (App. Ct. of the Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe Jan. 5, 2005) (on file with author) 
(detailing how the Bureau coerced the Saginaw Chippewa Tribe into adopting a constitution 
that excluded tribe members living off the reservation from membership). 
 60. 1983 Memorandum, supra note 58. 
 61. See generally COHEN, supra note 6, at 2–3. 
 62. See Robert B. Porter, The Meaning of Indigenous Nation Sovereignty, 34 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 75, 87–88 (2002) (describing the Assistant Secretary’s exercise of authority in this case as 
“virtually unlimited authority”). 
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elections from 1997 to 1999.63 Membership in the Saginaw Chippewa 
tribe is often a contentious issue, especially given the large gaming 
revenues the tribe distributes to its members.64 The major issue in the 
1997 through 1999 elections was the parallel political drive to change 
the tribe’s constitution to reduce membership.65 The tribal council, 
led by Kevin Chamberlain, became known as the “holdover council” 
when it did not step down after its term of office ended.66 It originally 
ran on a platform of membership and constitutional reforms in 
1995.67 By 1997, when the time came for new elections, the 
Chamberlain council had done little to effectuate the membership and 
constitutional reforms promised, but it had presided over the 
establishment of a hugely successful gaming enterprise.68  
The council members succeeded in the tribe’s primary election, 
but only four survived the general election.69 In accordance with 
tribal law, the council was authorized to review election results and 
declare them invalid, which it did.70 They held a curative election in 
January of 1998 that produced similar results, and the council 
nullified this election as well.71 At that point, its term expired.72 
Shortly thereafter, the holdover Chamberlain council suspended 140 
tribal members from exercising their membership rights (e.g., 
voting), a decision the tribal court of appeals suggested was 
unconstitutional.73 
 63. See Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe v. Gover, No. 99-10327, 1999 WL 33266029, at 
*1 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 19, 1999); Chamberlain v. Peters, 27 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law 
Training Program, Inc.) 6085, 6086–88 (App. Ct. of the Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe Jan. 5, 
2000). 
 64. Cf. Lincoln v. Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe, 967 F. Supp. 966 (E.D. Mich. 1997) 
(dismissing claim requesting court to force tribe to admit plaintiff as a member and allow her to 
enjoy the tribe’s per capita gaming revenue distributions), aff’d, 156 F.3d 1230 (6th Cir. 1998). 
 65. See generally King v. Norton, 160 F. Supp. 2d 755 (E.D. Mich. 2001); Hinmon v. 
Tribal Council, No. AC-03-1015 (App. Ct. of the Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe Sept. 29, 
2003); Chamberlain, 27 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law Training Program, Inc.) at 6086. 
 66. Chamberlain, 27 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law Training Program, Inc.) at 6087. 
 67. See id. 
 68. See id. 
 69. See id. 
 70. See id. 
 71. See id. 
 72. See id. 
 73. See id. at 6086–87, 6087 n.4. 
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The Chamberlain council then held another primary election, but 
only one of its members qualified for the general election.74 It 
nullified this second primary, but enacted a law allowing the tribal 
court to review its election certification decisions.75 The tribal court 
then reviewed and dismissed a claim that the Chamberlain council 
should be held in contempt for failure to hold a curative election.76 
The Chamberlain council, entering its second year as holdovers, held 
a third primary election on January 19, 1999.77 This election gave rise 
to the Peters council.78 However, one month later, the Chamberlain 
council entered a ruling that invalidated the January 19 election.79 
Dissatisfied with the Chamberlain council’s actions, a group of 
tribal members convened to hold their own, parallel elections.80 The 
Chamberlain council enacted a sedition law to prohibit this activity, 
but the elections went ahead with the support of the Peters council.81 
Both councils initiated a drive to persuade Gover to recognize 
their council.82 The Chamberlain council also mounted a media 
campaign that strongly criticized the administration of Gover’s 
Bureau of Indian Affairs.83 The Assistant Secretary eventually 
responded to the dueling councils by writing a letter suggesting that 
the Chamberlain council hold another election within forty-five days, 
and implying that the most recent election held by the Chamberlain 
council, in which the Peters council was more or less victorious, was 
valid in the Bureau’s opinion.84 The Assistant Secretary wrote that 
without a new election, the Bureau would deal only with the persons 
allegedly elected on January 19, 1999.85 When the Chamberlain 
 74. See id. at 6087. 
 75. See id. 
 76. See id. 
 77. See id. 
 78. See id. 
 79. See id. 
 80. See id. 
 81. See id. at 6086–87. 
 82. See id. at 6087. 
 83. See id.; William Claibourne, Tribe PR Drive Targeted BIA Head, WASH. POST, Aug. 
16, 1999, at A13. The purpose of this media campaign was unclear, but most certainly could not 
have helped the Chamberlain council. 
 84. See Chamberlain, 27 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law Training Program, Inc.) at 
6087. 
 85. See id. 
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council did not hold an election within forty-five days, the Assistant 
Secretary wrote another letter to Chamberlain, informing him that the 
local Bureau officials would deal only with the eleven persons who 
received the most votes in the January 19 primary.86 
Immediately, the Chamberlain council brought an action in the 
federal district court challenging the Bureau’s decision and asking for 
a temporary restraining order.87 The district court denied the request, 
relying principally on the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Goodface v. 
Grassrope.88 Goodface presented facts superficially similar to the 
Saginaw Chippewa case. In Goodface, a tribal council elected in 
1980 competed with a council allegedly elected in 1982 for 
recognition from the Bureau.89 The court properly held that it lacked 
jurisdiction to decide which council should ultimately win, but 
recognized that the Bureau had the authority to recognize one or the 
other in the interim.90 The purpose of this authority was to avoid 
“jeopardiz[ing] the continuation of necessary day-to-day services on 
the reservation.”91 Determining the valid leadership of an Indian tribe 
is, according to another federal court, required in order to fulfill the 
Bureau’s “responsibility to administer its trust duties to the Indian 
people.”92 Since federal courts have no jurisdiction to decide the 
merits of a tribal election dispute,93 only the Saginaw Chippewa tribal 
judicial system could resolve the case. 
 86. See id.; see also id. at 6097–98 (reproducing the letter); William Claibourne, U.S. 
Ousts Tribe’s Leaders, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 1999, at A13 (“Gover replaced the 10-member 
tribal council headed by Chief Kevin Chamberlain with 12 candidates who Gover said had 
received the largest number of votes in the most recent election.”). Significantly, since two 
candidates tied for tenth place, Mr. Gover instructed local Bureau officials to recognize eleven 
instead of ten persons as included in the full Tribal Council. See Saginaw Chippewa Indian 
Tribe v. Gover, No. 99-10327, 1999 WL 33266029, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 19, 1999); 
Chamberlain, 27 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law Training Program, Inc.) at 6087. 
 87. See Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe, 1999 WL 33266029, at *1. 
 88. See id. at *2–3 (citing Goodface v. Grassrope, 708 F.2d 335, 337, 339 (8th Cir. 
1983)). 
 89. See Goodface, 708 F.2d at 336–37. 
 90. See id. at 339. 
 91. Id.  
 92. Milam v. U.S. Dep’t. of the Interior, 10 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law Training 
Program, Inc.) 3013, 3015 (D.D.C. 1983). 
 93. E.g., In re Sac & Fox Tribe, 340 F.3d 749, 763–64 (8th Cir. 2003); Saginaw 
Chippewa Indian Tribe v. Gover, No. 99-10327, 1999 WL 33266029, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 
19, 1999) (citing Runs After v. United States, 766 F.2d 347 (8th Cir. 1985)); Wis. Winnebago 
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When the matter finally reached the Saginaw Chippewa Tribe’s 
appellate court,94 it held first that the actions of the Chamberlain 
council were invalid once its term of office expired.95 Turning to the 
validity of the Bureau’s decision to recognize the so-called Peters 
council, the appellate court excoriated the Bureau. The court 
reviewed the Assistant Secretary’s letter and found three serious 
flaws. First, the Bureau provided no legal authority for issuing a 
decision at all, which is significant because neither council had 
formally initiated an administrative action. Second, the Bureau’s 
decision violated the tribal constitution by recognizing eleven instead 
of ten persons. Third, the Bureau’s decision again violated the tribal 
constitution by recognizing the victors of a tribal primary election, 
not of a general election.96 
The appellate court held that the Bureau did not possess the 
authority to recognize the victors of a tribal election, even in the 
interim.97 The court noted first that no statute exists that expressly 
authorizes the Bureau to take this interim step of recognizing one 
party over another in a protracted tribal election dispute.98 Second, 
the court, acknowledging the Bureau’s duty to administer federal 
programs,99 refused to accept the argument that the Bureau 
consequently had authority to “recognize” one side over the other.100 
Bus. Comm. v. Koberstein, 636 F. Supp. 814 (W.D. Wis. 1986); Kickapoo Tribe v. Thomas, 10 
Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law Training Program, Inc.) 3093, 3094 (D. Kan. 1983) (citing 
Potts v. Bruce, 533 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1976); McCurdy v. Steele, 506 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 
1974); and Motah v. United States, 402 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1968)). 
 94. The Saginaw Chippewa appellate court was composed of Carey Vicenti, Cheryl 
Fairbanks, and Frank Pommersheim—an extremely distinguished group. Professor Vicenti is 
Apache and has written articles on Federal Indian law, e.g., The Social Structures of Legal 
Neocolonialism in Native America, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 513 (2001). Professor 
Pommersheim has written very important works on tribal courts and Indian law in general, e.g., 
FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS: AMERICAN INDIAN LAW AND CONTEMPORARY 
TRIBAL LIFE (1995). Ms. Fairbanks is an Alaska native, long time practitioner of Indian law, 
and co-chair of the 2006 Federal Bar Association’s Indian Law Conference. 
 95. See Chamberlain v. Peters, 27 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law Training Program, 
Inc.) 6085, 6088–90 (App. Ct. of the Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe Jan. 5, 2000). 
 96. See id. at 6091. 
 97. See id. at 6091–95. 
 98. See id. at 6091–92. 
 99. See id. at 6092. 
 100. See id. (“You either meet the requirements to qualify for federal funding or you don’t. 
Yet it is much more difficult to extend this obvious federal governmental responsibility to the 
right and duty to legally decide who is the ‘recognized’ governing body of the Tribe.”). 
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The court characterized the Bureau’s actions as “assum[ing] the 
worst and proceed[ing] accordingly. This is the trustee not as helpful 
partner, but as arrogant superior.”101 
Third, the court found no case law to support the Bureau’s actions. 
The court distinguished the Goodface case on the simple but 
fundamental ground that the party recognized by the Bureau in that 
case had allegedly won a general election.102 Moreover, the Goodface 
decision explicitly stated that the Bureau’s recognition in that 
instance was valid until the tribal court made a final determination. In 
the Saginaw Chippewa case, however, the Bureau and the competing 
councils all proceeded without filing an appeal to the tribal appellate 
court.103 In short, the court found both parties at fault for going 
directly to the Bureau for relief when tribal court remedies were still 
available, and found the Bureau at fault for proceeding on the merits 
without directing the parties to the tribal court. 
The import of this case study is that the Bureau can influence, or 
even decide, the outcome of a tribal election by recognizing a winner 
before the tribal election dispute process concludes. Moreover, the 
Bureau will attempt to force a tribe to conduct elections at a 
particular time and in a particular manner—sometimes to the 
detriment of tribal courts, as in this case study. Because there are two 
sides to every dispute, the Bureau will be tempted to choose a side 
with the best argument, particularly if there appears to be an inequity.  
 101. Id. at 6093. 
 102. See id. at 6094. 
 103. See id. at 6093–94. The appellate court further criticized the Secretary of Interior 
when he refused to file a friend of the court brief in the appellate court action. See id. at 6094–
95 n.40. Scott Keep, the Assistant Interior Solicitor, declined to file a brief on the grounds that 
the Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe v. Gover, No. 99-10327, 1999 WL 33266029 (E.D. Mich. 
Aug. 19, 1999), case was extant in the federal courts. See Chamberlain, 27 Indian L. Rep. (Am. 
Indian Law Training Program, Inc.) at 6094–95 n.40. The court concluded that the Department 
as a whole had utterly “disrespect[ed]” the court first by not directing the parties to the tribal 
court for relief and then by refusing to participate as an amicus. See id. at 6094–95. 
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C. Indian Gaming and Off-Reservation Trust Acquisitions 
The Secretary of Interior, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the 
National Indian Gaming Commission have begun to systematically 
erode the reach of both the Indian Gaming Regulation Act (IGRA),104 
and the discretionary authority of the Secretary to acquire trust land 
for tribes.105 This is done by creating artificial territorial barriers to 
Indian gaming through the arbitrary exercise of the Secretary’s 
authority to take land into trust for the benefit of Indian tribes. 
Though IGRA and the trust land acquisition statute say nothing about 
territorial or geographic limitations on Indian gaming, all three 
federal political entities have begun to impose geographic limitations 
as to where Indian gaming may take place. These limitations arise as 
political decisions and serve to subvert Indian tribes by using statutes 
otherwise designed to assist tribes. 
The legislative history regarding the territorial and geographic 
reach of Indian gaming is sparse, apparently because Congress, the 
agencies, and the tribes assumed that Indian tribes would never think 
about gaming outside of their immediate traditional territory or, 
conversely, that silence in the statute allowed for expansion. 
Congress’s purpose in enacting IGRA was to codify and clarify 
Indian gaming, especially considering the uncertainty of the 
application of several federal and state laws to tribal gaming 
customers, such as the Organized Crime Control Act106 and the 
Johnson Act,107 and the possibility that states would arrest non-
Indians leaving Indian gaming establishments.108 
Congress enacted IGRA after the Supreme Court’s decision in 
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,109 in which the Court 
held that federal law did not authorize the state of California to 
enforce its gaming laws against the tribe.110 IGRA allows Indian 
 104. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–21 (2000). 
 105. See id.§ 465; 25 C.F.R. § 151 (2004). 
 106. 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (2000) (prohibiting illegal gambling businesses). 
 107. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1171–78 (2000) (regulating transportation of gambling devices). 
 108. See State ex rel. Poll v. Mont. Ninth Judicial Dist. Ct., 851 P.2d 405 (Mont. 1993). 
 109. 480 U.S. 202 (1987). 
 110. See id. at 211. 
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tribes to conduct casino-style gaming “on Indian lands.”111 Moreover, 
the tribe must “exercise[] governmental power” over those lands in 
order for them to qualify as gaming lands.112 Land held in trust by the 
Secretary for the benefit of the tribe is sufficient to meet the 
“exercise[ing] governmental power” requirement.113 IGRA also 
prohibits gaming on Indian lands after October 17, 1988 (IGRA’s 
enactment date) unless the tribe undergoes a Secretarial 
determination process wherein the Governor of the affected state 
maintains a veto,114 or the lands are “restored” to a “restored” Indian 
tribe.115 Nowhere does IGRA limit the geographic reach of these 
“Indian lands” or “restored lands.”116 
One of the inherent limitations of gaming as a revenue source for 
many tribes is their location away from the gaming markets. 
Relatively few tribes are fortunate enough to be located near non-
Indian population centers. Once the statutory authority for Indian 
gaming was in place, tribes located far from viable gaming markets 
began to apply to take off-reservation land into trust. Because IGRA 
[T]hat an otherwise regulatory law is enforceable by criminal as well as civil means 
does not necessarily convert it into a criminal law within the meaning of Pub. L. 280. 
Accordingly, we conclude that Pub. L. 280 does not authorize California to enforce 
Cal. Penal Code § 362.5 within the Cabazon and Morongo Reservations. 
Id. 
 111. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(a), (d) (2000).  
 112. See id. § 2703(4)(B). 
 113. Id. Indian tribes have jurisdiction over trust lands. See South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux 
Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998); see also Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 140 
(1982) (holding that Indian tribes are “invested with the right of self-government and 
jurisdiction over the persons and property within the limits of the territory they occupy”) 
(citation omitted). 
 114. See 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A) (2000). 
 115. See id. § 2719(b)(1)(B)(iii). 
 116. Senator Daniel K. Inouye, former Chairman of the Senate Committee on Indian 
Affairs and one of the principal drafters of IGRA, has expressly denied that IGRA included a 
geographic limitation. See Bay Mills Indian Community Land Claims Settlement Act: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 107th Cong. 30 (Oct. 10, 2002) (statement of Sen. 
Daniel K. Inouye). 
In the testimony that was presented here, you suggested that Congress did not 
anticipate land approximately 250 miles from a reservation area being acquired in a 
settlement for purposes of gaming. Where do you find that intent, because I happen to 
have been the author of IGRA and I believe I participated in just about every debate on 
this matter. 
Id. 
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created the National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC) as the 
federal agency to oversee some aspects of Indian gaming,117 that 
agency had first crack at defining the meaning of “Indian lands” and 
“restored lands” when confronted with a tribe’s request to take off-
reservation lands into trust for gaming purposes.  
The NIGC’s initial (implied) opinion as to the existence of a 
geographic limitation to “Indian lands” or “restored lands” came in 
1997 when it reviewed the Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians 
Restoration Act.118 The question was whether lands taken into trust in 
accordance with that Act could be considered “restored lands.”119 The 
Interior Solicitor focused on language that the land acquisition at 
issue was within a ten county area that formed the Band’s service 
area,120 and he opined that the land was therefore “restored land.”121 
The seeds of a geographic limitation were thereby planted. 
In subsequent opinions, the Solicitor’s office focused on 
geographic limitations that appeared in other tribe-specific land 
acquisition statutes or in statutes implementing land claim settlements 
in this manner, extrapolating a geographic limitation onto “restored 
lands” that did not exist in IGRA.122 Eventually, in a case concerning 
the Grand Traverse Band’s Turtle Creek Casino, a federal district 
 117. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2704–08 (2000). Sections 2704 through 2708 created the NIGC to 
regulate and oversee only Class II gaming, which is bingo-type gaming (not casino-type 
gaming, which is Class III). See id. § 2706(b). Frank Ducheneaux and Pete Taylor wrote a very 
enlightening piece about the origins of IGRA, particularly as it relates to the NIGC’s authority. 
See Franklin Ducheneaux & Peter S. Taylor, Tribal Sovereignty and the Powers of the National 
Indian Gaming Commission (undated) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). In short, 
the authors persuasively argued that IGRA never intended the NIGC to have authority over 
casino-style gaming. See id. at 49–54. Distinguished commentators have harshly criticized 
IGRA and the expansion of the NIGC’s powers. See generally Robert B. Porter, Indian Gaming 
Regulation: A Case Study in Neo-Colonialism, 5 GAMING L. REV. 299 (2001). 
 118. 25 U.S.C. § 1300j (2000). 
 119. See Memorandum from the Office of the Solicitor, Dep’t of the Interior, to Sec’y of 
the Interior (Sept. 19, 1997) (on file with author) [hereinafter 1997 Memorandum]. 
 120. See 25 U.S.C. § 1300j-6 (2000). 
 121. See 1997 Memorandum, supra note 119. 
 122. E.g., Memorandum from Derril B. Jordan, Assoc. Solicitor, Div. of Indian Affairs, to 
Hilda A. Manuel, Deputy Comm’r for Indian Affairs (Nov. 12, 1997) (on file with author) 
(focusing on the geographic limitation on mandatory trust acquisitions in the Little Traverse 
Bay Bands of Odawa Indians Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1300k-4(a) (2000)); Memorandum from Derril 
B. Jordan, Assoc. Solicitor, Div. of Indian Affairs, to Acting Dir., Indian Gaming Mgmt. Staff 
(Mar. 16, 1998) (on file with author) (focusing on the geographic limitation on mandatory trust 
acquisitions in the Little River Band of Ottawa Indians Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1300k-4(b)). 
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court reviewed the Pokagon, Little Traverse, and Little River 
opinions of the Interior Solicitor, and mused in dicta that “the 
location of the acquisition” of after-acquired lands might be taken 
into consideration in determining whether the lands are “restored 
lands.”123 The Department became bolder after this opinion was 
issued, asserting in an opinion concerning the Confederated Tribes of 
Coos, Lower Umpqua and Suislaw Indians that “‘restored lands’ . . . 
include only those lands that are available to a restored tribe as part 
of its restoration to federal recognition.”124 This very restrictive 
definition was struck down by the district court for the District of 
Columbia in 2000.125 However, the court quoted language from the 
Grand Traverse Band case suggesting that a geographic limitation of 
“restored lands” might still be plausible.126 Again, there was no 
statute, regulation, or snippet of legislative history to support this 
limitation. 
The Department went back to work, creating from its own 
opinions the legal authority for the concept of a geographic limitation 
to the “restored lands” exception in IGRA. The Department again 
opined that a trust acquisition within the area of a restoration act was 
“restored land,” solidifying its previous position with citations to its 
own prior opinions.127 
Finally, the NIGC provided a lengthy opinion on the Grand 
Traverse Band’s Turtle Creek Casino on remand from the federal 
district court.128 The NIGC, consistent with previous opinions on 
geographic limitations, opined that “the phrase ‘restoration of lands’ 
is a difficult hurdle and may not necessarily be extended, for 
 123. See Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians v. U.S. Att’y, 46 F. Supp. 
2d 689, 700 (W.D. Mich. 1999). 
 124. Memorandum from Interior Solicitor to Assistant Sec’y, Indian Affairs (Oct. 19, 
1999) (on file with author). 
 125. See Confederated Tribes of Coos, Lower Umpqua and Siuslaw Indians v. Babbitt, 116 
F. Supp. 2d 155, 161–64 (D.D.C. 2000). 
 126. See id. at 164 (quoting Grand Traverse Band, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 700). 
 127. See Memorandum from Derril B. Jordan, Assoc. Solicitor, Div. of Indian Affairs, to 
Deputy Comm’r of Indian Affairs (Apr. 18, 2000) (on file with author) (focusing on the land 
acquisitions area of the Paskenta Band Restoration Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1300m-3(a) (2000) and 
citing the Little Traverse and Pokagon opinions). 
 128. See Letter from Kevin K. Washburn, Gen. Counsel, Nat’l Indian Gaming Comm’n, to 
Hon. Douglas W. Hillman, Senior U.S. Dist. Judge (Aug. 31, 2001), available at National 
Indian Gaming Commission, www.nigc.gov/nigc/documents/land/hillman.jsp. 
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example, to any lands that the tribe conceivably once occupied 
throughout its history.”129 The district court affirmed the NIGC’s 
stance.130 
Bootstrapping onto the “restored lands” decisions, the Secretary of 
Interior, Gale Norton (a protégé of former Secretary Watt)131 entered 
the debate and applied this reasoning to fee-to-trust acquisitions 
under 25 U.S.C. § 465. In approving by inaction the Class III gaming 
compact between the Seneca Nation of Indians and the State of New 
York, the Secretary asserted her own views as a political appointee: 
“I believe that IGRA does not envision that off-reservation gaming 
would become pervasive.”132 The Secretary threatened to bar 
virtually all off-reservation trust acquisitions if the land is intended 
for gaming operations: 
I am nevertheless concerned that elements of this Compact 
may be used by future parties to proliferate off-reservation 
gaming development on lands not identified as part of a 
Congressional settlement but instead on lands selected solely 
based on economic potential, wholly devoid of any other 
legitimate connection. Thus, to the extent that other states and 
tribes model future compacts after this one, and seek to have 
the United States take land into trust for these gaming 
ventures, they should understand that my views regarding land 
acquired through a Congressional settlement are somewhat 
different from my views when a tribe is seeking a discretionary 
off-reservation trust acquisition. . . . While I do not intend to 
signal an absolute bar on off-reservation gaming, I am 
extremely concerned that the principles underlying the 
enactment of IGRA are being stretched in ways Congress 
never imagined when enacting IGRA.133 
 129. Id. 
 130. See Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians v. Office of the U.S. Att’y, 
198 F. Supp. 2d 920, 935–36 (W.D. Mich. 2002), aff’d, 369 F.3d 960 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 131. See Nancy Benac, Bush Nominees May Have a Hard Road, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
ONLINE, Jan. 3, 2001, available at 2001 WL 3648685. 
 132. Letter from Gale A. Norton, Sec’y of the Interior, to Hon. Cyrus Schindler, Nation 
President, Seneca Nation of Indians (Nov. 12, 2002) (on file with author). 
 133. Id. 
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Again, there is no statute or legislative history supporting this 
limitation. 
The most recent decisions out of the NIGC on “restored lands” 
treat the geographic limitations—more or less created from whole 
cloth—as hornbook law.134 Thus, the train rolls along. 
The import of these agencies’ interpretations of the law is that 
newly-recognized tribes with little or no trust land are strictly limited 
in restoring their reservations for gaming purposes. For tribes like the 
Grand Traverse Band, which has not had any land taken into trust 
without comment from the Bureau or the Department since 1996, the 
promise of the Indian Reorganization Act, enacted to help tribes 
restore their stolen land base,135 is a slowly emptying vessel. 
D. The Secretary and the Indian Land Claims Limitation Act 
In the 1950s, during the peak of the termination era,136 the 
Secretary of Interior and the Bureau of Indian Affairs engaged in a 
massive sell-off of trust lands held on behalf of individual Indians 
and Indian tribes.137 This sell-off, without the consent of Indians or 
tribes, often moved forward under the auspices of 25 U.S.C. § 372, 
which authorized the Secretary to sell Indian allotments whenever he 
“decide[s] one or more of the heirs [to an allotment] to be 
incompetent.”138 Section 372, enacted in 1910,139 was severely 
restricted by the Indian Reorganization Act in 1934,140 which, inter 
alia, limited the authority of the Secretary to sell Indian lands without 
 134. See, e.g., Memorandum from Maria Getoff, Staff Att’y, NIGC, to Philip N. Hogan, 
Chairman, NIGC (Mar. 24, 2004) (on file with author) (rejecting the Wyandotte Nation of 
Oklahoma’s attempt to begin gaming in Kansas City, Kansas). 
 135. See WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 24–25 (4th ed. 
2004). 
 136. In 1953, Congress explicitly entered the termination era by expressing its intent to 
force tribes and Indians to be “subject to the same laws as are applicable to other citizens of the 
United States.” Id. at 26 (quotation omitted). The starkest action taken by Congress during this 
era was to dissolve Indian tribes by statute and convert tribal lands into public lands. See id. 
 137. See Cohen, supra note 4, at 364–65. 
 138. 25 U.S.C. § 372 (2000). The federal regulation following from this statute extends 
(without statutory support) the authorization to sell trust lands as well. See 25 C.F.R. § 152.20 
(2004) (“[I]f the Secretary decides that one or more of the heirs who have inherited trust land 
are incapable of managing their own affairs, he may sell any or all interests in that land.”). 
 139. See Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 431, § 1, 36 Stat. 855 (1910). 
 140. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 461–94 (2000). 
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the consent of the affected tribe.141 However, by 1953, the Bureau 
took a narrow view of this provision and began its sell-off. Generally, 
tribes with trust or allotment land that were not federally recognized 
at the time, tribes that did not reorganize under the Indian 
Reorganization Act, and Minnesota tribes subject to the Nelson Act142 
suffered these land divestitures. 
The mechanics of these sales typically began with a request from 
a non-Indian business interested in acquiring natural resources on 
land occupied by Indians.143 Also, state departments of natural 
resources or conservation often sought to acquire trust allotments for 
study, to expand state land holdings, or to open up the area for public 
use.144 With the Eisenhower Administration fully in favor of 
terminating the trust responsibility,145 the sale of Great Lakes Indian 
lands began with the study of Indian heirship determinations in 
accordance with section 372.146 Once the Bureau completed locating 
as many heirs as they could, they sent them letters asking for their 
consent to sale. Rarely did the Indian heirs consent,147 so the 
Department simply declared an heir to be incompetent and proceeded 
with the sale anyway. Under section 372, they only needed to 
unilaterally declare one heir incompetent.148 One Grand Traverse 
Band Ottawa member, John Bailey, recalled the story of his mother 
refusing to consent to the sale when she received her letter: 
 141. See id. § 483a. 
 142. The Nelson Act implemented the General Allotment Act in Minnesota. See 25 Stat. 
642 (1908); Cass County, Minn. v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103, 113 
(1998). 
 143. See Dr. James McLurken, South Fox Island: Its Historical Importance to the Grand 
Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians 64–65 (Aug. 28, 2001) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter South Fox Island Report] (“Field Agent Barns also 
received numerous and sustained requests to buy four timber-rich allotments on Beaver Island. 
Superintendent Cavill sent the Barns recommendation for investigation of heirship and other 
criteria required to instigate the sale of trust land on the islands to the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs for instructions.”). 
 144. See id. at 68. For allotments ranging in size from twenty to 160 acres on South Fox 
Island, Michigan, the State offered to purchase them for between $220 and $600. See id. 
 145. See id. at 66–67. 
 146. See 25 U.S.C. § 372 (2000). 
 147. Usually, the Indians contacted did not respond, so the Bureau assumed that they had 
consented to the sale, see South Fox Island Report, supra note 143, at 71, a highly dubious legal 
position to take. 
 148. 25 U.S.C. § 372 (2000). 
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[T]hey had a fear of the government coming back and taking 
something, or more. She said whatever the amount of money 
that they were talking about—her and my dad—was not 
enough to even bother about it. 
I know they didn’t send it in. She didn’t sign it and they put it 
away. Fact is, I do recall the letter was around the house for 
probably a couple of years before it might have finally got 
thrown out or just disappeared or whatever. I know they kept it 
for awhile, but they never sent it in.149 
Another Grand Traverse Band Ottawa member, Eva Petoskey, 
actually owns the letter that her mother received from the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs regarding an heirship claim on the Sam Bird, South 
Fox Island, homestead. The letter gave heirs thirty days to “show 
cause why the rejection of the application of Sam Bird should not be 
made final and the case closed.”150 Ms. Petoskey’s family received 
approximately five dollars in compensation for the loss of their 
allotment.151 
Other Ottawas signed the document from the Bureau without 
understanding its import. Darrell Wright’s mother signed the sales 
consent form thinking that it was merely an authorization for the 
Nickerson lumber company to take some timber off the land.152 When 
she received $1500 for the allotment, Mr. Wright recalled: “When I 
saw the price she got, I thought, ‘Well, that’s alright for the timber, 
you know.’ When I heard she might have signed something to give 
away her land, I didn’t think that’s great.”153 
On South Fox Island, Michigan, for example, the federal 
government originally provided fifteen allotments to Michigan 
Ottawa families and then, years later, sold eleven of those allotments 
to the Nickerson family’s lumber concern,154 without the consent of 
 149. South Fox Island Report, supra note 143, at 73–74 (quoting John Bailey, member of 
the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians). 
 150. Id. at 74 (quoting Eva Petoskey, member and former Vice Chair of the Grand Traverse 
Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians). 
 151. See id. 
 152. See id. at 75. 
 153. Id. (quoting Darrell Wright, member of the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and 
Chippewa Indians). 
 154. See id. at 69. 
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most of the Indian heirs. As Han Walker, Jr., former Associate 
Solicitor for Indian Affairs, wrote in 1979: “[B]etween the years 
1948 and 1958 Bureau personnel authorized conveyances of trust 
allotments without the consent of all the beneficial heirs under 
circumstances where one of the heirs was determined to be 
incompetent.”155 
By 1978, Bureau field solicitors became convinced that the sales 
of the Great Lakes Indians’ allotments during the 1950s were likely 
void ab initio, creating a cloud on the title to hundreds of 
thousands—and possibly millions—of acres. In 1978, a field solicitor 
from the Minneapolis office wrote a memorandum describing the sale 
of approximately 2000 parcels that took place in Minnesota.156 The 
field solicitor estimated “that it is likely that the figure is even greater 
on the reservations under the jurisdiction of the Great Lakes Agency 
and the Michigan Agency.”157 The next year, the Associate Solicitor 
for the Bureau of Indian Affairs concluded that sales made during the 
1950s in compliance with section 372 were void ab initio.158 
Though federal law requires the United States attorney to 
represent Indians in all suits at law and equity,159 in 1978, the United 
States Attorney General, Griffen Bell, explicitly stated that he would 
not bring any land claim suits on behalf of Indian tribes or individual 
Indians because of the harm to the current landowners, who he 
claimed to be “innocent.”160 Arlinda Locklear, who litigates Indian 
 155. Memorandum from Hans Walker, Jr., Acting Assoc. Solicitor, Indian Affairs, to 
Assistant Sec’y, Indian Affairs (Feb. 16, 1979) (on file with author). 
 156. See Memorandum from Field Solicitor, Twin Cities, Minn., to Solicitor, Dep’t. of 
Interior (Mar. 7, 1978) (on file with author). 
 157. Id. 
 158. See Memorandum from Thomas W. Fredericks, Assoc. Solicitor, Indian Affairs, to 
Solicitor, Dep’t. of the Interior, & Assistant Sec’y, Indian Affairs (May 31, 1979) (on file with 
author). 
As a result, it appears that numerous transactions were entered into without the 
requisite authority and are therefore void. . . . Current holders of those 160-acre 
allotments include non-Indians, municipalities, Indian tribes, and federal agencies such 
as the U.S. Forest Service. Their titles now suffer from a severe cloud which is a direct 
result of unauthorized administrative action. 
Id. (citing Ewert v. Bluejacket, 259 U.S. 129 (1922)). 
 159. 25 U.S.C. § 175 (2000). 
 160. Letter from Griffen B. Bell, Att’y Gen., to Cecil B. Andrus, Sec’y of the Interior, 
reprinted in S. REP. NO. 96–569, at 12 (1980). 
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land claims in New York state and elsewhere, argued that these 
“innocent” landowners 
are not innocent in any sense of the word. They are trespassers. 
They have been sued because they have been sitting on, taking 
advantage of, and enjoying the benefit of land that belongs to 
the [Indian] people. . . . [E]ven if they had not been aware of 
that fact 100 years ago, if I had to venture a guess, I would say 
that a good 75% of them had personal knowledge of that fact 
when they acquired the land.161 
Despite the fact that the landowners likely knew full well that they 
had been living on Indian land, and despite the fact that the federal 
government knew about its illegal transactions that divested Indians 
of their land, the Attorney General will not file land claims on behalf 
of Indian tribes.  
In 1982, Congress enacted the Indian Claims Limitation Act of 
1982.162 This statute: 
[P]rovides that there is no limitations period for suits for 
possession or title brought by the United States. Title 28 
U.S.C. § 2415(b) provides that Indian claims that are on a list 
published by the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to section 
4(c) of the Indian Claims Limitations Act of 1982 are not 
barred until (1) one year after the Secretary publishes, in the 
Federal Register, a rejection of the claim, or (2) three years 
after the Secretary submits legislation to Congress to revoke 
the claim.163 
So, in 1983, the Secretary published the list of Indians with 
potential land claims for their lost allotments,164 including the South 
Fox and Beaver Island claims.165 To date, the Secretary has initiated 
 161. Arlinda Locklear, Morality and Justice 200 Years After the Fact, 37 NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 593, 598 (2003). 
 162. 28 U.S.C. § 2415 (2000). 
 163. Seneca Nation v. State, 26 F. Supp. 2d 555, 573 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (citations omitted), 
aff’d, 178 F.3d 95 (2nd Cir. 1999), cert. denied, New York v. Seneca Nation, 528 U.S. 1073 
(2000). 
 164. See 48 Fed. Reg. 13,698 (Mar. 31, 1983). 
 165. See id. at 13,876. 
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litigation to recover this land only rarely, preferring to not investigate 
the claim at all. In sum, since the Secretary was told by the Attorney 
General that the United States will never initiate land claim litigation 
again,166 these claims are tabled forever. 
The four case studies in this section have attempted to describe 
how the ideal of self-determination articulated by Congress and the 
President can be undermined by bureaucratic implementation of 
federal law. Each of these studies symptomatize a broader problem in 
the federal executive, detailed in Part III. 
III. COLONIALISM CRIPPLES MEANINGFUL SELF-DETERMINATION 
There is a difference between self-determination for Indian tribes 
as an ideal and as a meaningful, objective concept. Meaningful self-
determination for American Indian tribes requires the United States 
government to recognize certain rights that an indigenous nation must 
possess to survive. These rights include the right of an Indian tribe to 
determine its membership without any interference; the right to 
conduct its own internal political activities without any interference; 
the right to restore its land base; the right to a legal remedy; and the 
right to a competent trustee. These rights must be recognized and 
applied by federal bureaucrats tasked with administering the trust 
responsibility between Indian tribes and the United States, just as 
they have been recognized by Congress and by the judiciary (with 
notable exceptions). Without a rigorous and disciplined hands-off 
approach by federal bureaucrats in areas of tribal membership, tribal 
law and constitution-making, and tribal elections, the ideal self-
determination recognized by Congress and the judiciary is 
meaningless. The placement of procedural and political barriers to 
effective redress of tribal land claims and land base restoration by an 
incompetent trustee renders meaningful self-determination 
unattainable. 
 166. See supra note 160. 
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A. The Right to Determine Tribal Membership 
The question, “Who is an Indian?,” intrigues (and sometimes 
baffles) legal and political experts.167 The Supreme Court’s attempts 
to answer the question yielded contradictory results;168 Congress 
subsequently enacted statutory definitions.169 The short answer for 
legal purposes is “it depends.” It depends completely on the 
circumstances. As Stephen Pevar wrote, “[e]ach government—tribal, 
state, and federal—determines who is an Indian for purposes of that 
government’s laws and programs.”170 If the Bureau grants a 
preference in employment to an Indian,171 then it must follow the 
definition in the Indian preference authorizing statute.172 If the Indian 
Health Service provides services to an Indian,173 then it also must 
follow the definition in its authorizing statute.174 The same rule 
applies for federal criminal jurisdiction.175  
But for purposes of an Indian tribe’s recognition of its own 
membership, no federal or state law should apply. The Supreme 
Court recognized long ago that Indian tribes have exclusive authority 
to determine their own internal affairs.176 The question is whether the 
Bureau will stay out of internal tribal matters and let the tribes decide 
the question of membership—the most critical question any tribe 
 167. See COHEN, supra note 6, at 2–3; PEVAR, supra note 57, at 18–19. For a recent review 
of the historical tension between federal and tribal law as to the definition of “Indian,” see 
Bethany R. Berger, “Power over This Unfortunate Race”: Race, Politics and Indian Law in 
United States v. Rogers, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1957 (2004). 
 168. For an excellent description of the Supreme Court’s hypocrisy, racism, and 
contradiction relating to the definition of “Indian,” see Lawrence R. Baca, Diversity and the 
Federal Bar Association, FED. LAW., Feb. 2003, at 23, 27–28 (comparing United States v. 
Joseph, 94 U.S. 614 (1876), with United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913), where the 
Court came to opposite conclusions as to whether the Pueblo Indians were “Indian” as defined 
under federal law). 
 169. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000). 
 170. PEVAR, supra note 57, at 18. 
 171. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974). 
 172. See 25 U.S.C. § 472 (2000). 
 173. See Indian Health Care Improvement Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1601–83 (2000). 
 174. See 25 U.S.C. § 1603(c) (2000). 
 175. E.g., Scrivner v. Tansy, 68 F.3d 1234, 1241 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 
1178 (1996). 
 176. See Cherokee Intermarriage Cases, 203 U.S. 76 (1906); cf. Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 
U.S. 556 (1883) (holding that federal courts had jurisdiction to entertain prosecution of Indian 
for crime committed in Indian Country). 
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must decide. As noted, federal law allows the Bureau to force tribes 
to adopt the Bureau’s definition of membership by granting the 
Bureau an effective veto over a tribe’s initial constitution, and often 
the amendment of that constitution.177 
In short, if an Indian tribe wants to adopt non-Indians, Canadian, 
Central, or South American Indians, or Indians of other tribes into 
their own as full or partial members, then federal law and federal 
bureaucrats should not have a say in the matter. If the feds have a 
problem providing services or funds to a tribe where the authorizing 
statute defines “Indian” in a too-limited fashion, then the feds are free 
to withhold those services, just as the Chamberlain court indicated.178 
Whether a particular member of an Indian tribe is eligible for certain 
federal programs must not determine who may be a member of a tribe 
for tribal law purposes. There may be circumstances where a person 
is an Indian for tribal purposes, but not for federal purposes, and vice 
versa.179 That right to decide should always remain with the tribe.  
The Bureau expanded its authority to approve tribal constitutions 
and equated it with the power to set eligibility requirements for 
federal programs, thereby imposing its own views of tribal 
membership. On occasion, the Bureau justifies its intervention with 
the assertion that it does not want to create classes of tribal members, 
or that the provision of federal programs will become unduly 
complicated. The Bureau can advise the tribe to make decisions on 
these bases and the tribe may even follow its advice, but the Bureau 
must not force its bureaucratic conveniences down the throats of 
Indian tribes. Indian tribes must not allow the Bureau to assert 
authority it does not have to define tribal membership. 
The first question—and it is a continuing question—for every 
Indian tribe is, “Who is in this tribe?” By definition, only the tribe 
can answer the question. If the tribe must then face consequences 
 177. See supra Part II.A. 
 178. See Chamberlain v. Peters, 27 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Training Program, Inc.) 
6085, 6092 (App. Ct. of the Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe Jan. 5, 2000). 
 179. See Halbert v. United States, 283 U.S. 753 (1931) (holding that children of Indian who 
were not members of tribe could still receive allotment from federal government); United States 
v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567 (1846) (holding that non-Indian adopted into tribe remains subject to 
federal criminal laws); cf. Nofire v. United States, 164 U.S. 657 (1897) (holding that tribal 
member adopted into tribe is subject to tribal criminal laws). 
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under the express language of federal statutes, then so be it, but the 
Bureau must back out of these purely internal tribal decisions. 
B. The Right to Resolve Internal Disputes 
Tribal self-governance is nothing without the exclusive right to 
decide internal political disputes. As a general matter, it is well 
established that the Bureau must refrain from interfering in internal 
tribal issues, such as election disputes.180 In cases that appear to be 
situations of extraordinary, arbitrary and capricious actions by Indian 
tribal governments, it is understandable for federal agencies to seek 
to intervene.181 Nevertheless, they must not. Federal agencies have no 
authority to enter into these disputes. 
Colonialism can come in the form of paternalism. A critical 
element of federal Indian law is the trust relationship: the concept 
that the federal government is tasked with protecting individual 
Indians and Indian tribes from states,182 non-Indians,183 and 
themselves.184 It is premised on the belief that Indians are weak and 
wholly dependent on the federal government, often due to the 
 180. See Alcantra v. Acting Pac. Reg’l Dir., Bureau of Indian Affairs, 37 I.B.I.A. 136, 137 
(2002) (noting that the Bureau tends to avoid interfering in internal tribal affairs in the interest 
of tribal self-determination); cf. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (holding 
that federal courts have no jurisdiction over internal tribal matters); Ordinance 59 Ass’n v. U.S. 
Dep’t. of the Interior Sec’y, 163 F.3d 1150, 1154–58 (10th Cir. 1998) (same); Akins v. 
Penobscot Nation, 130 F.3d 482, 488 (1st Cir. 1997) (same); Bowen v. Doyle, 880 F. Supp. 99, 
112–13 (W.D.N.Y. 1995) (same). 
 181. See United States v. Wadena, 152 F.3d 831, 857 (8th Cir. 1998) (Beam, C.J., 
concurring and dissenting) (“Until Congress specifically provides for jurisdiction over this type 
of internal tribal matter, we must avoid the paternalistic temptation to assert jurisdiction based 
on the subjective belief that federal intervention is the only way to protect the civil rights of 
tribal members.”). 
 182. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384–85 (1886). 
These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They are communities dependent on 
the United States,—dependent largely for their daily food; dependent for their political 
rights. They owe no allegiance to the states, and receive from them no protection. 
Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the states where they are found are often 
their deadliest enemies. 
Id. 
 183. See id. 
 184. See id.; cf. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831) (“Meanwhile they [the 
Indians] are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to 
his guardian.”). 
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militant and often genocidal actions of the federal government. This 
concept of a trust relationship has allowed Congress to enact statutes 
that offer great assistance to Indian tribes,185 but it has also allowed 
Congress to unilaterally abrogate treaties and take tribal property 
with little or no compensation.186 In short, it is a mixed bag. This 
tension existing between self-determination and the trust relationship 
is likely to dominate federal Indian law for another century. 
With this tension in mind, federal bureaucrats must look to the 
bigger picture when analyzing the internal workings of internal tribal 
disputes. Both Congress and the executive have spoken uniformly in 
favor of continued tribal self-determination.187 Despite the best of 
intentions, interfering (or even suggesting the possibility of 
interfering via silence, ambiguity, or outright threat) in tribal disputes 
by recognizing one faction over another, for the purpose of continuity 
in the provision of federal statutes, fundamentally retards the growth 
of Indian tribes as viable, long-term governing bodies. Indian tribes 
must go through these growing pains, just as the Union itself went 
through them; the 1801 electoral tie is one such example.188 
Tribes such as the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa 
Indians underwent a constitutional crisis early in its history when a 
newly-elected councilor was declared unfit for office by the 
remainder of the Tribal Council.189 The Tribal Council voted to 
 185. E.g., Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–63 (2000); Indian Reorganization 
Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461–94 (2000). 
 186. See Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955) (allowing Congress to 
take land held under Indian title without just compensation); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 
553 (1903) (allowing Congress to allot Indian land without Indian consent). 
 187. E.g., 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (2000) (“The purpose of this chapter is to provide a 
statutory basis for the operation of gaming as a means of promoting tribal economic 
development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments . . . .”); id. § 450(b)(1) (“[T]rue 
self-determination in any society of people is dependent upon an educational process which will 
insure the development of qualified people to fullfill meaningful leadership roles . . . .”); 
Government-to-Government Relations with Native American Tribal Governments, 59 Fed. 
Reg. 22,951 (May 4, 1994); see also CANBY, supra note 135, at 33 (“At present, then, 
congressional and executive federal Indian policy seems clearly to be based on a model of 
continuing pluralism; it recognizes that the tribes are here to stay for the indefinite future, and 
seeks to strengthen them.”). 
 188. See generally Jennifer Van Bergen, Aaron Burr and the Electoral Tie of 1801: Strict 
Constitutional Construction, 1 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 91 (2003). 
 189. See In re McSauby, No. 97-02-001-CV-JR, slip op. at 5–6 (Grand Traverse Band 
Tribal Ct. July 30, 1997) (en banc) (on file with author). 
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remove the newly-elected councilor due to alleged misconduct 
relating to a dispute over a land transaction between the councilor 
and the tribe.190 The tribal court, only a few years in operation, 
confidently and competently handled a very difficult political crisis 
involving the procedures for removal of a Tribal Councilor191 and the 
procedures for hearing a critical case en banc (as the full tribal 
judiciary),192 and created critical tribal common law on the question 
of appointed counsel in such matters, if necessary.193 While this crisis 
was not as critical as the one at the Saginaw Chippewa Tribe, the 
tribal court created tribal common law where necessary and built the 
foundations of its future legitimacy and efficiency. Other Michigan 
tribal courts have provided necessary guidance in election disputes to 
the tribal government, even as the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
intervened in the Saginaw Chippewa Tribe’s election dispute.194 
In addition to impeding the development of tribal courts, the 
expectation that the Bureau might intervene in tribal election disputes 
encourages tribal members to bring suits and complaints to federal 
and state courts, or to the Bureau itself. Even without adequate 
empirical evidence, it appears that litigation over matters of internal 
tribal governance has exploded in the last few years.195 In most 
instances, the courts dismiss the claims for lack of jurisdiction. But 
 190. See id. 
 191. See id. at 5–10. 
 192. See GRAND TRAVERSE BAND CONST. art. VIII, § 2(a) (1988), available at 
http://www.narf.org/nill/Constitutions/grandtraverseconst/grandtraversetoc.htm. 
 193. See McSauby, slip op. at 1–5. 
 194. See Crampton v. Sam, 27 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law Training Program, Inc.) 
6239 (Little River Band of Ottawa Indians Tribal Judiciary Feb. 23, 1999). 
 195. E.g., In re Sac & Fox Tribe, 340 F.3d 749 (8th Cir. 2003) (refusing jurisdiction over 
internal tribal leadership dispute); Torres v. Wickliff, 47 F. App’x 537 (10th Cir. 2002) 
(dismissing claim that Bureau improperly withdrew recognition of individuals as the governing 
members of the tribe on grounds that they were not members); Sac & Fox Tribe v. Bureau of 
Indian Affairs, 321 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (N.D. Iowa 2004) (rejecting challenge by tribal election 
board to Bureau’s recognition of election held by dissident faction of tribe); In re Marriage of 
Jacobsen, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 162 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (ordering tribal member to provide alimony 
through payment of per capita tribal gaming proceeds); Ackerman v. Edwards, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
517 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (refusing jurisdiction over claim that tribe should be ordered to enroll 
plaintiffs); Johnson v. Wright, 682 N.W.2d 671 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (taking jurisdiction over 
case involving tribal member’s per capita gaming payments); Salinas v. Lamere, No. RIC 
406255 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 23, 2004) (on file with author) (taking jurisdiction over enrollment 
dispute), rev’d, 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 880 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).  
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some state courts, particularly in California, are beginning to take 
jurisdiction over these types of cases.196 This, too, hampers tribal self-
determination by encouraging tribal members to disregard their own 
chosen dispute resolution process in favor of seeking outside, 
“impartial” mediators. The Saginaw Chippewa appellate court 
properly chastised the actions of both councils to seek recognition 
from the Bureau, but the actions of the Bureau in response to these 
requests for intervention undermined the legitimacy of tribal courts 
across the country. It is truly unfortunate—though understandable—
that tribal members continue to seek relief for allegedly unfair tribal 
decisions from non-tribal courts and bureaucrats. 
The Bureau’s lead in intervening in difficult tribal election 
disputes in cases such as the Saginaw Chippewa epitomizes how bad 
facts make bad law. The Bureau’s intervention contravenes 
Congressional and Presidential statements about self-determination 
and tends to de-legitimize tribal court development specifically, and 
tribal governance generally. Simple discipline on the part of the 
Bureau to stay out of these disputes would go a long way towards 
improving tribal governance structures. 
C. The Right to a Land Base and Government Revenue 
Meaningful self-determination includes the right to a land base 
and the right to raise revenue for government purposes. 
Unfortunately, the Secretary’s authority to acquire land for tribes and 
hold it in trust in perpetuity is discretionary.197 Moreover, Indian 
tribes’ ability to generate income from off-reservation sources is also 
based on bureaucratic discretion. This discretion is virtually absolute 
and nothing prevents the Secretary from sitting on trust land 
acquisition applications from tribes for years. The Grand Traverse 
Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians, for example, has not had land 
taken into trust by the Secretary since 1996, even though the tribe’s 
numerous applications are complete and include land contiguous to 
 196. See Salinas, No. RIC 406255. 
 197. See 25 U.S.C. § 465 (2000). 
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its current trust land. Many other tribes complain of the same 
problem.198 
The Indian Reorganization Act’s promise to help restore the 
Indian tribes massive land base prior to 1887 appears hollow. As the 
National Congress of American Indians noted, “[a]lthough 8 million 
acres have returned to tribal control, that represents less than 10% of 
the lands lost through allotment.”199 Worse, for many tribes, the 
promise of IGRA to assist tribes in developing strong economies and 
governments is realized only by those tribes fortunate enough to be 
located near population centers, or, as in the case of the Seneca 
Nation, to have political power and resources sufficient to persuade 
the governor of New York and the Secretary of Interior (who, at the 
moment, are Republicans) to allow off-reservation gaming. Though 
nothing in the language of the IRA or IGRA explicitly precludes off-
reservation gaming and land acquisitions, federal bureaucrats tend 
toward limiting the opportunities for Indian tribes with grave 
economic and governmental needs. In short, tribes have little choice 
but to barter their sovereignty for economic resources—
unfortunately, similar to the manner in which tribes with membership 
and election disputes momentarily gave up tribal rights in order solve 
their problems. 
The federal agency opinions about IGRA, coupled with the 
Secretary’s actions in rewriting the rules relating to trust acquisitions, 
compel tribes to trade sovereign rights. Now tribes are forced to reach 
agreement with every state, local, and municipal government entity 
even remotely affected by the acquisition of trust land before the 
Secretary will consider taking the land into trust.200 Tribes must give 
away five, ten, even twenty-five percent of net gaming proceeds to 
the state in order to convince the state to allow Indian gaming.201 
 198. See Anita Fineday, Remarks at the 17th Annual Indian Law Symposium, University of 
Washington (Sept. 9, 2004). 
 199. Brief for Amici Curiae National Congress of American Indians et al. in Support of 
Defendants-Appellees at 5 n.2, Carcieri v. Norton, 398 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 2005) (No. 03-2647), 
available at http://216.69.166.179/sct/carcieri/ncai-tribes-amicus-brief.pdf. 
 200. Cf. Heidi McNeil Staudenmaier, Off-Reservation Native American Gaming: An 
Examination of the Legal and Political Hurdles, 4 NEV. L.J. 301, 310 (2003). 
 201. See generally Alan Meister, Tribal-State Gaming Compacts and Revenue Sharing: A 
California Case Study, 7 GAMING L. REV. 347 (2003). 
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Moreover, tribes must donate their limited resources to the political 
party in power in Washington, D.C., to have them notice that the tribe 
requires assistance.202 Thanks to the direction taken by the federal 
bureaucrats, trust acquisitions and off-reservation gaming soon will 
become far too expensive even to attempt. 
D. The Right to a Remedy and the Right to a Competent Trustee 
The right to a fair and impartial forum to recover tribal property 
fraudulently taken by individuals, the states and localities, and the 
federal government is also necessary for meaningful self-
determination. The United States’ failure to bring suit to recover 
lands fraudulently sold without the consent of Indians means that 
Indian tribes remain disposed of lands rightfully theirs, and that non-
Indians and local governments are stuck with clouded titles to the 
land they currently occupy.203 While there are numerous examples of 
land claims filed, followed by Congressional land settlement acts to 
clear title and compensate the Indian victims,204 these are relatively 
rare. More common is the circumstance where an Indian tribe goes it 
alone, without its trustee, and loses in federal or state court on a 
procedural technicality.205 The Department of Justice could cure this 
defect and force these issues to conclusion,206 but it does not. And the 
 202. See Tribal Lobbying Matters: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 108th 
Cong. 2 (2004) (statement of Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Chairman, S. Comm. on Indian 
Affairs) (“[S]ix tribes paid Mr. Scanlon more than $66 million, and . . . Mr. Scalon, in turn, paid 
Mr. Abramoff more than $21 million [for his share of the scheme].”), available at 
http://indian.senate.gov/2004hrgs/092904hrg/Campbell.pdf; Thomas Edsall, Probe to Include 
GOP Donations, WASH. POST, May 18, 2004, at A17. 
 203. See supra Part II.D. 
 204. E.g., Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act of 1980, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1721–35 (2000); 
Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1701–16 (2000); Florida Indian Land 
Claims Settlement Act of 1982, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1741–50(e) (2000); Mashantucket Pequot Indian 
Land Claims Settlement Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1751–60 (2000); Wampanoag Tribal Council of 
Gray Head, Inc., Claims Settlement Act of 1987, 25 U.S.C. § 1771 (2000); Puyallup Tribe of 
Indians Settlement Act of 1989, 25 U.S.C. § 1773 (2000); Mohegan Nation of Connecticut 
Land Claims Settlement Act of 1994, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1775–75h (2000). 
 205. E.g., Spirit Lake Tribe v. North Dakota, 262 F.3d 732 (8th Cir. 2001); Bay Mills 
Indian Cmty. v. W. United Life Assurance Co., No. 2:96-CV-275, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
20782 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 11, 1998), aff’d, 208 F.3d 212 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 206. State sovereign immunity, laches, and other procedural defects do not prevent the 
federal government from bringing Indian lands claims. See generally County of Oneida v. 
Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985). 
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largest reason it does not, despite the fact that non-Indians want these 
cases decided in order to clear title for once and for all,207 is because 
the cases are just too hard. There are too many documents, too many 
transactions, too many parties, and too much money. 
This same argument was made by the defendants in the Cobell v. 
Norton litigation. The litigation was initiated by Eloise Cobell and 
the Native American Right Fund over accounting for Individual 
Indian Money accounts held in trust by the Department of Interior.208 
Courts in other cases have had no choice but to place a number of 
federal officials in contempt because it appears it was simply too hard 
for them to do the work—work that should have been done all 
along.209 The federal bureaucrats wait and wait, letting problems 
accumulate until it is too late and until the federal courts are 
breathing down their necks. 
It is the same argument federal bureaucrats in the Branch of 
Acknowledgement and Research, charged with administratively 
recognizing Indian tribes,210 make when they get behind in processing 
applications for tribal recognition.211 There are too many applications, 
too many documents to review, too much history to cover. The 
applications build up and there is no one to do the work. 
The end result of all this bureaucratic incompetence (admittedly 
spurred by congressional inaction and failure to adequately fund and 
staff the bureaucracy) is mounds and mounds of litigation. The 
Individual Indian Money accounts case212 is eight years running and 
the BAR is getting further behind every day. The litigation now 
consumes an enormous amount of the Bureau of Indian Affairs’ time. 
 207. See, e.g., Manypenny v. United States, 948 F.2d 1057, 1061 (8th Cir. 1991) 
(discussing how land claim victory by Indian in State v. Zay Zah, 259 N.W.2d 580 (Minn. 
1977), contributed to landowners seeking legislation from Congress to quiet title in the White 
Earth Land Settlement Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99–264, 100 Stat. 61 (1986), to Minnesota 
acreage clouded by potential Indian land claims). 
 208. See generally Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 209. See generally In re Brooks, 383 F.3d 1036 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (denying motion to 
disqualify lower court judge from hearing contempt proceedings against federal officials). 
 210. See 25 C.F.R. § 83.4 (2004) (requiring a letter of intent requesting tribal 
acknowledgement to be filed with the Branch of Acknowledgement and Research). 
 211. E.g., Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, Inc. v. Norton, 336 F.3d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 
2003); Ramapough Mountain Indians v. Norton, 25 F. App’x 2 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Muwekma 
Tribe v. Babbitt, 133 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000). 
 212. Cobell, 240 F.3d 1081. 
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Federal court orders requiring the BAR to drop one activity and vault 
another to the forefront, such as in the Muwekma Tribe case,213 work 
to the detriment of those tribes that patiently wait in line. The 
massive Cobell litigation is even worse, taking up so much of the 
Bureau’s time that the Bureau now can legitimately excuse its failure 
to issue decisions in fee-to-trust applications. Federal bureaucrats, 
with their years of historical incompetence, effectively 
institutionalized a do-nothing Bureau. In large part, this is due to 
Indians and Indian tribes whose only recourse is to sue the trustee. 
The land claims put aside by Congress in 1982 will stay there, 
possibly forever, until some young, ambitious, and brilliant Indian 
lawyer decides to sue the Secretary for failure to take action, shutting 
down the system again. Meaningful self-determination requires that 
the trustee take a proactive approach to its relationship with Indian 
tribes. Until that happens—and given the state of affairs we see 
today, it may never happen—the right of Indians and Indian tribes to 
a remedy for clear and compensable historical and modern wrongs is 
destroyed by its incompetent trustee. 
Colonialism is complete, it appears, when the front end of 
colonialism—the wars, the disease, and the genocide214—gives way 
to the back end—the incompetent trustee. Historical reconciliation or 
meaningful self-determination is unlikely to occur to anyone’s 
satisfaction absent a competent legal entity who can facilitate tribal 
government development. We see it in America with the Indian tribes 
just as we see it on television with the chaotic Iraqi occupation. It is 
the paradox of colonialism: the efficiency of the conqueror versus the 
inefficiency of the occupier.215 
 213. 133 F. Supp. 2d at 30. 
 214. See generally DAVID E. STANNARD, AMERICAN HOLOCAUST: COLUMBUS AND THE 
CONQUEST OF THE NEW WORLD (1992). 
 215. Compare William Bradford, “With a Very Great Blame on Our Hearts”: Reparations, 
Reconciliation, and an American Indian Plea for Peace with Justice, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1 
(2002–03), and Lindsey Glauner, Comment, The Need for Accountability and Reparation, 51 
DEPAUL L. REV. 911 (2002), with William C. Bradford, “The Duty to Defend Them”: A 
Natural Law Justification for the Bush Doctrine of Preventive War, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1365 (2004), and Eric Kades, The Dark Side of Efficiency: Johnson v. M’Intosh and the 
Expropriation of American Indian Lands, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1065 (2000). 
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IV. FUTURE BUREAUCRATIC ATTACKS ON MEANINGFUL SELF-
DETERMINATION 
The topics discussed in this Article are by no means complete. 
Examples of colonialism abound and are replete in case law and 
statutes, but bureaucratic colonialism mostly escapes the attention of 
politicians and judges (or is quietly encouraged). Due to this 
inattention and the insidious nature of bureaucratic colonialism, it 
will continue to appear in various matters. Anticipate more pressure 
to preclude Indian tribes from operating off-reservation. Anticipate 
the Bureau becoming more involved in brokering membership and 
election disputes, especially among gaming tribes. Anticipate the 
Department of Justice taking positions contrary to tribal interests in 
land claims and treaty rights cases. Attorney General Griffen Bell’s 
letter turns Derrick Bell’s interest-convergence theory into reality.216 
As new issues arise, federal bureaucrats may see fit to intervene in 
other areas of tribal affairs where they are not wanted. Anticipate the 
Bureau disapproving (without any enabling legal authority) an 
ordinance allowing tribal court recognition of same-sex marriages.217 
Anticipate the Bureau seeking to limit tribal expenditures in federal 
and state campaign contributions.218 Anticipate the Bureau seeking to 
hinder self-governance contracts,219 especially as more tribes take 
over their own federal programs and leave less congressional 
appropriations for the Bureau. 
In sum, the covert colonialism of the federal bureaucracy is not 
easily discoverable, nor can it easily be prevented by amendment of 
relevant statutes. The federal government has its tentacles all over 
every Indian tribal government. Whether it seeks to persuade, coerce, 
intimidate, or otherwise force a tribe to act in a certain fashion is a 
question for the bureaucracy to answer. Felix Cohen concluded his 
 216. See supra notes 138, 160. 
 217. See generally Wenona T. Singel, Remarks at the Federal Bar Association Indian Law 
Conference, Taboo Topics in Indian Country: Making Our Own Rules: Gay Marriage in Indian 
Country (Sept. 24, 2004). 
 218. See generally Editorial, Tribal Trickery, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 2004, at A26 (noting 
that the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs had scheduled a hearing to discuss tribal lobbyists’ 
over-billing and ethics). 
 219. See 25 U.S.C. § 450f (2000). 
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1953 article about the dreaded federal Indian bureaucracy with a 
warning that apparently has gone unheeded.220 
Migwetch. 
It has been said often enough, and with great truth, that expert 
knowledge of the cultures and histories, not alone of Indian 
generally, but of the many separate tribes, is needed to 
understand Indian needs, desires, actions, and responses, as 
well as to work intelligently and compassionately with Indians 
to help frame, administer, and service policies and programs 
for their benefit. 
—Alvin M. Josephy, Jr.221 
 220. See Cohen, supra note 4, at 390 (“What [federal Indian bureaucrats] forget is that in 
the long run we are all dead, and that while the means we use may be moulded by the ends we 
seek, it is the means we use that mould the ends we achieve.”). 
 221. Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., The American Indian and the Bureau of Indian Affairs, in RED 
POWER: THE AMERICAN INDIANS’ FIGHT FOR FREEDOM 78, 81 (Alvin M. Josephy, Jr. et al. 
eds., 2d ed. 1999). 
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